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3 The democratization of hostility

Minorities and radical right actors after the fall of communism

Lenka Bustikova

Introduction

The fall of the Berlin Wall opened up the wounds of nation building in Eastern Europe (Ramet 1999). While communist regimes were certainly not free of populist, nationalistic appeals (Jowitt 1992; also Kitschelt *et al.* 1999; Petersen 2002; Minkenberg 2007; cf. Bunce 1999), democratization elevated the importance of ethnic tensions, which in turn encouraged the mobilization of radical actors. The autocratic communist regimes had the advantage of controlling an oppressive state apparatus, which enabled them to contain not only ethnic minority demands, but also to quash any unsanctioned mobilization, violent or verbal, against ethnic, religious, or social minorities.

The police force was devoid of any public accountability and answered only to the ruling party. Communist autocracies were at liberty to attack their own citizens, but unsanctioned attacks of non-state actors on citizens were not tolerated. Public expressions of both liberal and illiberal civil society were severely constrained (Kopecký and Mudde 2003). While this thwarted the democratic aspirations of many East Europeans, it also curbed expressions of group animosity and prevented outright attacks on minorities. Communist autocracies in Eastern Europe maintained a delicate balance between repression and accommodation by making extensive use of surveillance and other instruments of the state apparatus. This delicate balance was disrupted in the 1990s as new democracies transformed their economies (Fish 1998; also Tucker 2006 Frye 2010; cf. Hanley and Sikk 2014) and systems of political representation, which opened the door to a third transformation: the relationship between majorities and ethnic, religious, and social minorities. The weakening of the state's repressive powers and the politicization of the police force after 1989 made possible an increase in attacks against minorities initiated by non-state actors.

In line with the conceptual framework of the book (Minkenberg, Chapter 2, this volume), this chapter considers radical actors, defined here by their positions on identity issues, as important actors of transformation. I argue that the expansion of minority rights generated a politicized

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response with limited and localized violence in states with resolved ethnic boundaries at the end of communism (cf. Brubaker 1997).

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Radical right actors and ethno-liberal actors

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In order to understand the impact of the post-1989 transformation on the mobilization of radical actors, we need to look at the nature of those identity-based grievances that have contributed to the mobilization of hostility (and its transformation over time) and at the patterns of interaction between radical actors and minorities. The primary targets of radical right hostility are minorities, as well as political parties and ideologically affiliated sympathizers who promote both minority rights and minority accommodation. Accommodation can be within the domain of language rights, increased autonomy, or economic policies aimed at improving their well-being. I refer here to these as ethno-liberal actors to denote the fact that they represent and advocate for both ethnic and social minorities (such as gays and lesbians). This dynamic interaction between radical right actors and ethno-liberal actors provide the foundation for mobilization on the basis of group hostility. Since the nature of the interaction is rarely economic, but predominantly focuses on identity issues, the dimensions that structure their interaction are almost exclusively identity based. It follows that to understand radical right actors, we must also consider the actions of the actors advocating on behalf of minorities.

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First, we must define radical right actors and ethno-liberal actors. Radical right actors are understood to be parties and social groups that identify with the radical right party ideology, which can be derived from the grid-group theoretical framework originally developed by anthropologist Mary Douglas and adopted in subsequent studies (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; also Coughlin and Lockhart 1998; Kitschelt 2007; Minkenberg 2013; Bustikova 2014). Two ideological dimensions define this typology – radical nationalism and radical socio-cultural conservatism – and these dimensions correspond to two modes of social control, ‘grid’ and ‘group.’ Radical right actors score high on grid and high on group, or high on one of these two dimensions and ‘neutral’ on the second dimension. Using this logic of classification, radical right actors are either highly nationalistic, highly socially conservative, or both. The list of radical right parties can be found in Table 3.1.

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If an actor scores high on one dimension and low on the other, they are not classified as a radical right actor. This framework is particularly helpful in deciding whether some of the former unreformed communist parties (red-brown parties) should qualify as radical right actors. For example, the Czech communist party is not a radical right party because it scores very low on the grid dimension as a result of its advocacy for gender equality and access to abortion.

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On the grid dimension, the policy positions of radical right actors are captured by authoritarian social and cultural conservatism. In its pure

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Table 3.1 List of radical right parties

Country	Parties
Albania	PBK-BK – Balli Kombëtar (National Front Party) PBKD – Balli Kombëtar Demokrat (Democratic National Front Party)
Bulgaria	BNRP – Bălgarska nacionalna radikalna partija (Bulgarian National Radical Party) NSA – Nacionalen sayuz Ataka (National Union Attack, which includes BNRP (Attack Coalition))
Croatia	HDZ – Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) HSP – Hrvatska stranka prava (Croatian Party of Rights) HSP-ZDS – Hrvatska stranka prava – Zagorska demokratska stranka HSP-HKDU – Hrvatska stranka prava – Hrvatska Kršćanska Demokratska Unija
Czech Republic	SPR-RSČ – Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa (Sládek) RMS – Republikáni Miroslava Sládka (Republicans of Miroslav Sládek) NS – Národní strana (National Party) NDS – Národně demokratická strana (National Democratic Party) DS/DSSS – Dělnická strana/Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti (Workers' Party)
Estonia	ERSP – Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei (Estonian National Independence Party) EK – Eesti Kodanik (Estonian Citizens) ERKL – Eesti Rahvuslaste Keskliit (Estonian Nationalists Central League) PE – Parem Eesti (Right Estonia) EIP – Eesti Iseseisvuspartei (Estonian Independence Party) Isamaa – Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit (Pro Patria and Res Publica Union)
Hungary	MIÉP – Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) MIÉP-Jobbik – (MIÉP – Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom – Movement for a Better Hungary) Jobbik – Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary)
Latvia	TB – Tēvzeme un Brīvībai (For Fatherland and Freedom) TB/LNNK – Apvienība Tēvzeme un Brīvībai/LNNK – Alliance For Homeland and Freedom/LNNK – Latvijas Nacionālās Neatkarības Kustība (Latvian National Independence Movement)
Lithuania	LKDS/LTJS – Jaunoji Lietuva susivienijimas uz vieninga Lietuva (Young Lithuania – For United Lithuania) LNP-JL – Lietuviu Nacionaline Partija – 'Jaunoji Lietuva' (Lithuanian National Party – Young Lithuania) LlaS – Lietuvos laisvės sąjunga (Lithuanian Liberty Union)

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62 *L. Bustikova*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Parties</i>	
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	LNDP – Lietuvos nacionaldemokratu partija (Lithuanian National Democratic Party)	3
Macedonia	VMRO-DPMNE – Vnatreška Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija – Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo (Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity)	4
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	VMRO-DP – Vnatreška Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija – Demokratska Partija	8
Poland	SN – Stronictwo Narodowe (National Party)	9
	Party X – Partia X	10
	PWN-PSN – Polska Wspólnota Narodowa – Polskie Stronictwo Narodowe (Polish National Commonwealth – Polish National Party)	11
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	ROP – Ruch Odbudowy Polski (Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland)	14
	LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)	15
	LPR – Liga Prawicy Rzeczypospolitej (The League of the Right of the Republic) (League of Polish Families (LPR) + Real Politics Union + Right of the Republic)	16
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Romania	PUNR – Partidul Unității Naționale a Românilor (Party of Romanian Unity)	19
	PRM – Partidul (Popular) România Mare (Party for Greater Romania)	20
	PNG – Partidul Noua Generație – Creștin Democrat (New Generation Party)	21
		22
	PP-DD – Partidul Poporului – Dan Diaconescu (People’s Party – Dan Diaconescu)	23
Serbia	SRS – Srpska radikalna stranka (Serbian Radical Party)	24
	NS – Nova Srbija (New Serbia)	25
	SPO – Srpski pokret obnove (Serbian Renewal Movement)	26
Slovakia	PSNS – Pravá Slovenská národná strana (Real Slovak National Party)	27
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	SNS – Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party)	30
Slovenia	SNS – Slovenska nacionalna stranka (Slovenian National Party)	31
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Ukraine	KUN – Kongres Ukraiins’kikh Natsionalistiv (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists)	33
	Rukh – Narodnyi Rukh Ukrajinjy (The People’s Movement of Ukraine)	34
	Svoboda – (Freedom)	35
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Source: Bustikova 2014.

form it has no ethnic basis. A political party, as an actor scoring high on social authoritarianism dimension, might campaign against accommodating gay and lesbian couples or against abortion. Similarly, an actor that promotes law and order, along with obedience to authority, religious or secular, would be classified as high on the grid dimension.

The group dimension, in contrast, captures nationalism and is therefore associated with exclusionary appeals based on ethnicity. Nationalism

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1 is defined as an exclusionary attitude that forces the other from the social
2 polity. Nationalists, for example, oppose expansion of minority language
3 rights or minority policy autonomy. 'Group' conceptualizes identity in
4 terms of 'the ethnic other' and is grounded in a distinction between the
5 in-group and the out-group. An actor that propagates nationalism on
6 behalf of the titular nationality would score high on the group dimension.

7 The classification of ethno-liberal actors mirrors this typology. Ethno-
8 liberal actors are those that score low on both grid and group, or they
9 score low on one of these two dimensions and 'neutral' on the second
10 dimension. For example, small East European socially liberal parties
11 embrace multiculturalism and the protection of minorities, and are often
12 advocates of Roma rights. Even though multiculturalism is a universalistic
13 position, it implies that social-liberal parties support policies that would
14 elevate the Roma from poverty and reduce their social exclusion. Small,
15 socially liberal parties in Eastern Europe are both rare and recent.

16 An actor that propagates nationalism on behalf of the titular nationality
17 would qualify as a radical right actor, whereas an actor making cross-ethnic
18 appeals and demanding minority rights would be classified as an ethno-
19 liberal actor. Small economically and socially liberal parties generally
20 support policies of minority accommodation, as do ethnic and some green
21 parties. Some of the policies that ethno-liberal parties promote include
22 minority autonomy in schooling, elevation of the minority language to the
23 status of the official language, quotas for ethnic minorities in Parliament,
24 positive discrimination, preferential treatment of minorities in civil service
25 hiring practices, state resources channeled to address minority griev-
26 ances, and preferential economic policies that disproportionately benefit
27 minorities.
28

29 **The expansion of minority rights and democratization of** 30 **animosity** 31

32 The weakening of the state oppressive apparatus, which not only allows for
33 the freedom of 'hostile' speech but also allows illiberal society to organize
34 better, recruit supporters, and, in some instances, intimidate minorities
35 without fearing a robust state response, is the core permissive condition
36 that has allowed for the rise of mobilization of hostility aimed at minor-
37 ities. As the communist state loosened its monopolistic grip on political
38 power, it lost its monopoly on state-sponsored and -sanctioned violence
39 against minorities. Democratization and political transformation freed
40 ethnic and social minorities to pursue their demands, but it also freed
41 members of majorities to express openly their hostility toward minorities.
42 Even in states with uncontested nation building, transformation from an
43 autocratic to a democratic regime has the potential to aggravate ethnic
44 tensions. The escalation of tensions between the majority and minority is
45 driven by tensions that escalate as minorities demand a greater share of





political power and policies to accommodate their particular needs (Bustikova 2014).

The autocrats in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia did not crush large minorities, but instead delicately balanced the needs of its ethnically diverse population while keeping a firm grip. The communist leadership of Czechoslovakia drew from both ethnic pools: Czechs and Slovaks. TV broadcasting was strictly bilingual and financial resources flowed back and forth between the two federal republics: a metro system was built in Prague and a manufacturing base was built in Slovakia. Furthermore, the federal arrangement, strengthened after the occupation by the Warsaw Pact in 1968, granted Slovaks parallel political institutions. In 1993 the deadlock over these federal institutions contributed to the separation of Czechoslovakia (Filipov *et al.* 2004), but so also did grievances of Slovaks and Czechs over the fairness of economic transfers within the federation.

Similarly, Tito's Yugoslavia shifted from ignoring Slavs of Muslim origin in Bosnia and Herzegovina to granting them a separate nationality status. Tito also granted autonomous status to Albanians in Kosovo (Siroky and Cuffe 2014). By the middle of the 1980s, the federation was on the path to fiscal decentralization, which allowed wealthier republics to keep more of their revenue (Petersen 2002). Additional concessions to Albanian claims later opened the door for the rise of Milošević to capitalize on the anger of the Serbian majority (Petersen 2002).

Communist federations and unitary states were equally apt not only in selective accommodation but in the oppression of minorities as well. The communist leaders of Poland mobilized anti-Jewish sentiments in 1968 and Bulgaria took an excessively hard stand against its Turkish minority in the late 1980s (Vachudova 2005). Roma children in communist societies were 'filtered out' into sub-par schools and Roma women were occasionally sterilized without informed consent. Religious groups operated under tight surveillance, and homosexuality was a strict social and political taboo.

However, the flip side of the omnipresent police presence and surveillance was that members of ethnic, religious, and social minority groups were more or less physically safe from the 'rotten' civil society (Kopecký and Mudde 2003). Skinhead groups and football hooligans already existed under communism (Kopecký and Mudde 2003), but were not allowed to terrorize Roma neighborhoods and villages, as they have done on numerous occasions since 1989.

East Europeans living under communism were not allowed to openly challenge the integrationist policies of communist regimes in public or exhibit open animosity, despite the fact that a majority despised the Roma community in many countries well before 1989. Since societal levels of crime were much lower under communism and state surveillance was omnipresent, Roma were better protected by the police force. Due to the equalizing effects of communist economies and market distortions, the

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1 adverse effects of economic stratification leading to housing inequalities
2 were greatly restrained under communism. The communist ideology took
3 pride in poverty alleviation policies and in the eradication of homeless-
4 ness, and portrayed it as a testament to the superiority of communist
5 regimes over the decadent West, which, in their view, was populated with
6 slums and had been torn apart by ethnic tensions.

7 The arrival of capitalism was, unfortunately, a deathblow to the eco-
8 nomic standing of the Roma, since it immediately exposed them to the
9 economic consequences of inadequate education. A relaxation of
10 the labor code and an influx of low-paid illegal workers contributed to the
11 replacement of Roma in low-skilled jobs. The living conditions of Roma
12 have deteriorated rapidly due to aggressive housing and residential poli-
13 cies aimed at converting apartments from rent-controlled to market-
14 driven pricing. The emergence of Roma ghettos after 1989 was facilitated
15 by myriad additional factors: The transition process created problems with
16 the legal status of some Roma settlements, housing subsidies were
17 reduced, and housing options were limited due to discriminatory practices
18 (Ringold 2000). A survey of 11 EU member states concluded at the begin-
19 ning of the millennium that: “about 45% of the Roma live in households
20 that lack at least one of the following basic housing amenities, namely
21 indoor kitchen, indoor toilet, indoor shower or bath, and electricity”
22 (EUA 2012).

23 Animosity towards Roma became more pointed and more open (see
24 also Mareš, Chapter 9, this volume). Roma are arguably the most universal
25 target for radical groups, and are commonly depicted as ‘welfare parasites’
26 living in ‘ghettos.’ As the economic and social predicament of the Roma
27 has worsened since 1989, so too has the police protection of Roma. Some
28 members of the police force also openly sympathize with anti-Roma senti-
29 ment (see Mareš, Chapter 9, this volume), and populist politicians are also
30 often unwilling to enforce Roma protection (Ringold 2000). Although it is
31 plausible to argue that radical right actors harbor hostility toward minority
32 groups, notwithstanding the change in minority economic, social, and
33 political status, innate xenophobia cannot explain the changing nature of
34 radical actor mobilization since 1989, unless one assumes that psychologi-
35 cal predispositions vary greatly over time.

36 Irritation with escalating ethnic demands can explain variation in the
37 mobilization of actors with hostile predispositions towards minorities and
38 can translate hostility into action. Hostile actions can range from demon-
39 strations, attacks on and intimidation of minorities, and active participa-
40 tion in ‘uncivil’ society, to participation in elections. Although the
41 communist leadership pursued populist and nationalistic policies, they
42 were never challenged with a competitor on the extreme side of the political
43 spectrum until the 1990s, when the political system has opened up to a wide
44 array of political actors, including radical right ones. Rustow argues that
45 where the definition of ethnic boundaries did not precede the transition to

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democracy, the relationship between nation building and democratization ought to be contentious (Rustow 1970; also Brubaker 1997; Siroky and Aprasidze 2011). Rustow's theory, however, treats those ethnic boundaries and ethnic status of groups negotiated before or immediately after the onset of democratization as stable.

It should follow that clear ethnic boundaries and a resolved definition of who belongs to the nation should be compatible with democratization. While this insight is highly accurate for the onset of democratization, it overlooks the possibility that ethnic relations might sour during the transition as a result of increasing minority demands or due to domestic and external pressures to expand minority rights (Jenne 2007; also Saideman 2001). Negotiated group boundaries are compatible with an increase of in-group hostility and group animosity during and after the transition period.

The highest level of relatively non-violent long-term radical right mobilization is not observed in countries with unresolved primordial ethnic boundaries, but rather in polities with non-negotiable institutions and constitutions that determine majority–ethnic minority status (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009; also Brubaker 1997; Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Bustikova 2014). Once boundaries are settled, negotiations between groups move to the domain of policy and rights. The expansion of rights, without challenging the core ethnic boundaries, creates powerful grievances, especially if small ethnic groups are viewed as being accommodated disproportionately in relation to their objective size.

Most of the post-communist new democracies that emerged from unitary states had settled on a definition of ethnic boundaries. But despite the fact that their national identity has been firmly established, the relationship between the majority and ethnic, social, and religious minorities underwent a transformation due to an increase in demands to acknowledge and accommodate minority rights and special minority needs (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov, Chapter 10, this volume; Haughton and Rybář 2008).

Changes in minority status, debates, and expansion of minority rights create an environment in which minority issues enter public discourse and become visible. This increased visibility, or salience, stimulates hostility and encourages radical right actors. At the international level, the European Union accession process also advanced the expansion of minority rights, while also anchoring East European states in the Western discourse on minority rights. The post-communist countries, almost all members of the Council of Europe, have seen the expansion of rights both on the ethnic dimension as well as on the social identity dimension.

Table 3.2 shows the dates when East European countries signed and ratified the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. This charter binds countries to provide accommodation for minority languages and subjects countries to evaluations and monitoring on how well the Charter is being implemented. Seventeen post-communist countries have signed the Charter and a majority of them implemented the treaty. Some

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Table 3.2 East European signatories of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992)

Country	Signature	Ratification	Entry into force
Albania			
Armenia	May 11, 2001	January 25, 2002	May 1, 2002
Azerbaijan	December 21, 2001		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	July 9, 2005	September 21, 2010	January 1, 2011
Bulgaria			
Croatia	May 11, 1997	May 11, 1997	January 3, 1998
Czech Republic	November 9, 2000	November 15, 2006	January 3, 2007
Estonia			
Georgia			
Germany	May 11, 1992	September 16, 1998	January 1, 1999
Hungary	May 11, 1992	April 26, 1995	January 3, 1998
Latvia			
Lithuania			
Moldova	July 11, 2002		
Montenegro	March 22, 2005	February 15, 2006	June 6, 2006
Poland	May 12, 2003	February 12, 2009	June 1, 2009
Romania	July 17, 1995	January 29, 2008	January 5, 2008
Russia	May 10, 2001		
Serbia	March 22, 2005	February 15, 2006	June 1, 2006
Slovakia	February 20, 2001	September 5, 2001	January 1, 2002
Slovenia	July 3, 1997	October 4, 2000	January 1, 2001
Macedonia	July 25, 1996		
Ukraine	May 2, 1996	September 19, 2005	January 1, 2006

Source: Council of Europe 2013.

countries adopted the treaty as early as 1992, others as late as 2005. Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Lithuania have not yet signed the Charter. Minority groups after 1989 are more vocal and more exposed to hostility. This is due to opportunities to enter competitive politics at the domestic level and to voice their demands.

In countries with both large and small minorities, radical right actors have mobilized against ethnic minority groups and policy concessions that were afforded to them (Auers and Kasekamp, Chapter 6, this volume). Dissatisfaction with the language law in Slovakia mobilized opposition against the Hungarian minority. Ukraine is divided over the language rights of Russians, and Macedonia over concessions given to Albanians after the Ohrid Agreement. The Russian minority has been a target of radical actor mobilization in Estonia and Latvia, since these two small countries gained independence. Lithuania is immersed in language wars over Polish names. Bulgarian radical actors mobilize against corrupt and clientelistic networks of the Turkish minority party, as do Romanian radical actors vis-à-vis the Hungarian minority and its political representatives. Table 3.3 lists major ethnic groups that serve as focal points of





Table 3.3 List of ethno-liberal parties

Country	Primary appeal	Minority	
Albania			1
PMDN – Human Rights Party	Ethnic	Greeks	2
UHRP – United for Human Rights Party	Ethnic	Greeks	3
PBDNJ – United Human Rights Party	Ethnic	Greeks	4
HRPP – Human Rights Protection Party	Ethnic	Greeks	5
Bulgaria			6
DPS – Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Ethnic	Turks	7
Croatia			8
SDS – Serb Democratic Party	Ethnic	Serbs	9
SNS – Serb People Party	Ethnic	Serbs	10
I – The Independent Democratic Serb Party	Ethnic	Serbs	11
Czech Republic			12
ODA (only 1992–1996) – Civic Democratic Alliance	Socially liberal + ethnic	Cosmopolitan, Sudeten Germans	13
Estonia			14
EUPR – Estonian United People's Party	Ethnic	Russians	15
Constitution – Constitution Party	Ethnic	Russians	16
VEE – Russian Party in Estonia	Ethnic	Russians	17
Hungary			18
SZDSZ – Alliance of Free Democrats	Socially liberal + ethnic	Cosmopolitan, Roma, Jews	19
Latvia			20
TSP – National Harmony Party	Ethnic	Russians	21
PCTVL – For Human Rights in United Latvia	Ethnic	Russians	22
Lithuania			23
AWPL – Electoral Action of Poles in Macedonia	Ethnic	Poles	24
DPA – Democratic Party of Albanians	Ethnic	Albanians	25
BDI (DUI) – Democratic Union for Integration	Ethnic	Albanians	26
Moldova			27
None			28
Montenegro			29
HGI – Croatian Civic Initiative	Ethnic	Croats	30
HGI-BS – Croatian Civic Initiative – Bosniak Party	Ethnic	Croats, Bosniaks	31
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<i>Country</i>	<i>Primary appeal</i>	<i>Minority</i>
Poland		
UW – Freedom Union	Socially liberal	Cosmopolitan
MN – German Minority	Ethnic	Germans
Romania		
UDMR – Democratic Union of Hungarians	Ethnic	Hungarian
Serbia		
SVM – Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians	Ethnic	Hungarians
MK – Hungarian Coalition	Ethnic	Hungarians
Slovakia		
MK – Hungarian Coalition	Ethnic	Hungarians
SMK – Party of the Hungarian Coalition	Ethnic	Hungarians
Most-Hid – Bridge	Ethnic	Hungarians
Slovenia		
LDS – Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	Socially liberal	Cosmopolitan
Ukraine		
SDPU – Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (since 2002)	Ethnic	Russians
KPU – Communist Party (since 2006)	Ethnic	Russians

Source: Bustikova 2014.

Note

The table lists ethno-liberal (ethnic and social liberal parties). The vast majority of parties are ethnic parties. Four socially liberal parties are or were present in ethnically homogeneous countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. However, even in these four cases, socially liberal parties advocated minority protection and accommodation under the umbrella of cosmopolitanism.

radical right mobilization. At the domestic level, the escalation of minority demands is driven by political success of minorities, as parties that promote the rights of minorities are able to cross the electoral thresholds and enter parliaments (Bustikova 2014).

This dynamic is distinct from hostility against ‘constitutive’ minorities that had autonomy in federal arrangements, and resulted either in secession or violent conflict after 1989. These ethnic disputes with constitutive minorities were not resolved by small-scale radical actor mobilization, but rather by clashes and outright separation (Siroky and Cuffe 2014). Most cases of radical actor mobilization are thus observed not in the context of multi-ethnic states, but in states with troubled relations with relatively small minorities.

At the international level, the process of the European Union accession puts post-communist countries under pressure to improve their minority rights (Kelley 2004; also Vachudova 2008). This is particularly relevant for ethnic minority rights and for the rights of social minorities. The EU





pressured Estonia and Latvia to improve the plight of Russians and ‘stateless’ children. Slovaks were pressured not to pursue a referendum on an unpopular language law that would have restricted the rights of the Hungarian minority on the eve of the accession. The EU has also been a strong advocate for the economic advancement of Roma and their economic, social, and political rights.

Aside from ethnic minorities, social minorities, such as gay and lesbian groups, have entered the public domain as well (O’Dwyer and Schwartz 2010; also O’Dwyer 2012), as public figures felt more comfortable disclosing their sexual orientation. Gay and lesbian activists have become more publicly active and started demanding modifications to registered partnerships, child adoption rules, as well as acceptance in society. As the community became more vocal and active, public verbal and physical attacks on the gay and lesbian community became more common as well.

Gay and lesbian rights were strictly limited under communism. Even though most Central European communist countries decriminalized homosexuality, homosexuals rarely expressed their identity in public. The rights of sexual minorities have been expanded since 1989. Table 3.4 shows the years when same-sex consensual acts between adults were decriminalized.

Table 3.4 Decriminalization of same-sex consensual acts between adults

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year of decriminalization</i>
Armenia	2003
Azerbaijan	2001
Georgia	2000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1998/2000
Macedonia	1996
Romania	1996
Albania	1995
Moldova	1995
Serbia	1994
Lithuania	1993
Russian Federation	1993
Estonia	1992
Latvia	1992
Ukraine	1991
Croatia	1977
Montenegro	1977
Slovenia	1977
Germany	1968/1969
Bulgaria	1968
Hungary	1962
Czech Republic	1962
Slovak Republic	1962
Poland	1932

Source: Council of Europe 2011.

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1 While about half of post-communist democracies had decriminalized same-
2 sex consensual acts before 1989, the second half did so only after the col-
3 lapse of the Berlin Wall (Table 3.4). Outside Central Europe, same-sex
4 consensual sexual acts between adults remained illegal until the early 1990s.

5 The concept of ‘the other,’ associated with the domain of social minor-
6 ities, has stretched the boundaries of anti-cosmopolitanism to include hostil-
7 ity toward sexual minorities who suddenly start making claims to be
8 recognized as equals. Gay/pride parades, a novelty in Eastern Europe,
9 have been attacked by radical actors in places as diverse as Czech Republic,
10 Georgia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Russia, Serbia, and Slovakia. As
11 gay and lesbian activists become less frightened of mobilizing and less hesi-
12 tant to acquire a public profile, radical actors start paying greater atten-
13 tion to the possibility of allowing the issue of LGBT citizens to ‘slide’ and
14 to tolerate their existence within society.

16 **Catching up**

17
18 The expansion of minority rights created a backlash not only because new
19 minorities are increasing their demands, but also because public opinion
20 lags behind this new, fast-paced development. In Western Europe, the
21 concept of gay rights has been evolving for several decades, whereas in
22 Eastern Europe the concept of rights for homosexuals is very new and
23 encounters strong opposition, especially when it comes to the right to
24 adopt children. Some still find gays and lesbians to be morally reprehensi-
25 ble. In contemporary Russia, gays and lesbians are under a systematic and
26 brutal attack by Putin’s coercive apparatus. Global pro-gay activists even
27 called for a boycott of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.

28 The concept of full political rights for minorities, the expansion of
29 rights for sexual minorities, and pressure to alleviate the marginalization
30 of Roma presents a challenge to most East European societies. This expan-
31 sion of minority rights was a combination of pressure from below and
32 compliance from above through the EU accession process. However, the
33 pressure from below was not the result of a broad consensus from a
34 socially liberal civil society to improve the lives and status of minorities.
35 Minority rights were expanded as means of appeasing politicized minor-
36 ities, often in exchange for their support for governmental coalitions or
37 liberal market policies. Furthermore, politicized minority groups and civil
38 society advocates in Eastern Europe sometimes bypassed their national
39 governments and applied pressure to expand minority rights with the help
40 of Brussels. Ethno-liberal parties, especially at the beginning of the trans-
41 formation, were often aligned with parties that promoted rapid economic
42 liberalization and the EU accession process. These ethno-liberal parties
43 used their coalition potential to extract concessions.

44 Gerschenkron’s famous thesis about the ‘advantage of backwardness’
45 can be applied here to the concept of minority rights (Gerschenkron





1962). If it was not for the pressure of the EU accession process and the desperate need of governments to secure the votes of ethnic and socially liberal parties in pushing liberal economic packages swiftly through East European parliaments, it is likely that the state of minority rights in Eastern Europe would be much bleaker today. East Europeans jumped over the developmental stage associated with liberal democracy and the protection of minority rights at a much faster pace than their Western neighbors. Public opinion is, however, still catching up to this development.

When compared to West Europeans, East Europeans express higher levels of hostility toward gays and lesbians (Council of Europe 2011). Table 3.5 shows the acceptability of having a gay or a lesbian person in the

Table 3.5 Acceptability of having a homosexual in the highest elected political position (%)

	<i>Uncomfortable</i>	<i>A little uncomfortable</i>	<i>Comfortable</i>
Bulgaria	49	15	8
Czech Republic	14	42	16
Germany, East	19	32	34
Estonia	40	22	25
Latvia	48	22	15
Lithuania	54	15	23
Hungary	36	28	17
Poland	26	20	39
Romania	52	19	12
Slovenia	38	21	36
Slovakia	36	35	18
Croatia	47	23	25
Macedonia	57	12	18
<i>Average</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>22</i>
Belgium	10	26	60
Denmark	10	14	75
Germany, West	18	28	37
Ireland	12	19	59
Greece	43	30	24
Spain	9	36	52
France	11	23	64
Italy	24	38	27
Luxembourg	14	21	39
Malta	17	28	43
Netherlands	5	23	69
Austria	23	39	22
Portugal	17	27	20
Finland	24	36	30
Sweden	6	13	78
United Kingdom	17	20	58
<i>Average</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>47</i>
Turkey	62	9	17
Cyprus	61	17	21

Source: Eurobarometer 2009.





1 highest elected political position in public opinion surveys. On average,
 2 only 22 percent of East Europeans are comfortable with a homosexual in
 3 high office as opposed to 47 percent in Western Europe. East Europeans,
 4 on average, display twice the hostility to sexual minorities in high political
 5 office.

6 This pattern is highly consistent with overall high levels of hostility
 7 towards ethnic minorities as well, as measured in other public opinion
 8 surveys (see Figure 2.1; also Kovacs 2010; Krekó *et al.* 2010; Krekó and
 9 Mayer, Chapter 8, this volume). Table 3.6 shows the acceptability of having
 10 an ethnic minority in the highest elected political position in public opinion
 11

12 *Table 3.6* Acceptability of having a person from a different ethnic origin than the
 13 majority of the population in the highest elected political position (%)

	<i>Uncomfortable</i>	<i>A little uncomfortable</i>	<i>Comfortable</i>
Bulgaria	31	31	21
Czech Republic	28	44	11
Germany, East	36	37	18
Estonia	23	31	36
Latvia	27	34	24
Lithuania	38	23	33
Hungary	24	43	22
Poland	14	26	48
Romania	16	35	29
Slovenia	30	27	39
Slovakia	24	44	24
Croatia	20	36	40
Macedonia	28	32	35
<i>Average</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>29</i>
Belgium	30	37	31
Denmark	20	20	58
Germany, West	30	29	28
Ireland	20	29	42
Greece	49	31	20
Spain	12	38	47
France	12	32	53
Italy	21	47	22
Luxembourg	17	25	35
Malta	40	33	19
Netherlands	18	41	38
Austria	35	42	14
Portugal	9	32	25
Finland	22	49	23
Sweden	9	23	66
United Kingdom	17	28	50
<i>Average</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>36</i>
Turkey	28	27	26
Cyprus	62	20	17

44 Source: Eurobarometer 2009.





surveys from 2009. Although the difference between the West and the East is not as pronounced as in the case of having a gay or a lesbian person in the highest office, the differences are nevertheless noticeable. On average, only 29 percent of East Europeans are comfortable with an ethnic minority occupying a position of political importance, while the level of acceptance is 7 percent higher (36 percent) among West Europeans.

The averages, however, hide a lot of disparities among the countries. For example, of all the Western countries, Austria is the least enthusiastic, having only one in seven people comfortable with an ethnic leader, but in Sweden two in three people are comfortable with diversity in the top political echelon. In Eastern Europe, two ethnically homogeneous countries are on the opposite side of the spectrum, the Czech Republic being the least tolerant and Poland having the largest share of the population comfortable with this hypothetical scenario. Countries with ethnic minorities that are well politically organized, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Macedonia, lie in the middle of the spectrum.

Expansion of ‘the other’

In the 1990s, ‘the other’ was mostly associated with groups of different ethnic origin. As the transition progressed, the ‘ethnic other’ boundary began to shift and the concept of ‘the other’ expanded to include groups that are not ethnic, but social: groups speaking a different language and cohabiting unmarried couples. Why? The understanding of ‘the other’ in Eastern Europe was more primordial at the beginning of transformation, and was not related to the expansion of various rights. Under communism, small ethnic groups were intimidated by the state and ethnic groups in large federations were granted some autonomous rights without challenging the ethnic hierarchy of groups. Since 1989, however, the implicit agreement between majorities and minorities has been transformed, and radical right parties have given voice to concerns over policies and targeted benefits delivered to minorities. For example, opposition to Turkish or Hungarian minorities can be expressed as opposition to policies that allow minorities to keep ethnic female last names: non-Slavic groups have been allowed to drop -ova from their last names since 1989. Other emerging issues include minority language rights and minority schooling for children. Rather than being driven by primordial hatreds, radical right actors are motivated by the goal of counter-demanding concessions on identity issues (see Pytlas and Kossack, Chapter 5, this volume).

Changes in the public perception of ‘the other’ reflect the expanding and malleable nature of the concept of a minority. Table 3.7 displays changes in factor loadings that relate to group hostility over time in three countries: Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovakia. These are based on two snapshots over time, the early to late 1990s and the early 2000s. While in the first time period the boundaries of ‘the other’ were defined purely by

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Table 3.7 Factor analysis: group hostility over time

Poland: 1994–1999	Ethnic groups	Social minority groups
People of a different race	0.78	
Immigrants/foreign workers	0.76	
Homosexuals		0.71
Drug addicts		0.78
People who have AIDS		0.62
Poland: 2005–2007	Ethnic and social minority groups	Social minority groups
People of a different race	0.70	
Immigrants/foreign workers	0.76	
People of different religion	0.77	
Unmarried couples living together	0.76	
People who speak a different language	0.77	
Drug addicts		0.76
Homosexuals		0.65
People who have AIDS		0.63
Bulgaria: 1994–1999	Ethnic groups	Social minority groups
People of a different race	0.79	
Immigrants/foreign workers	0.71	
People of a different religion	0.80	
Homosexuals		0.77
Drug addicts		0.65
Emotionally unstable people		0.71
Bulgaria: 2005–2007	Ethnic and social minority groups	Social minority groups
People of a different race	0.66	
Immigrants/foreign workers	0.67	
People of different religion	0.79	
Unmarried couples living together	0.69	
People who speak a different language	0.79	
Drug addicts		0.76
Homosexuals		0.71
People who have AIDS		0.72
Slovakia: 1990	Ethnic groups	Social minority groups
People of a different race	0.74	
Immigrants/foreign workers	0.68	
Muslims	0.63	
Homosexuals		0.70
Drug addicts		0.79
People who have AIDS		0.72
Slovakia: 2005–2007	Ethnic and social minority groups	Social minority groups
People of a different race	0.64	
Immigrants/foreign workers	0.75	
Muslims	0.76	
Homosexuals	0.63	
People who have AIDS	0.58	
Drug addicts		0.68
People with a criminal record		0.62

Source: World Value Survey 2010.

Note

Method: Factor analysis, varimax rotation. Question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please identify any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” The analysis excludes two items with low factor scores.

ethnic identity and social minority identity, the lines of delineation have shifted over time.

The factor analysis confirms the relevance of sorting identity delineations into two categories: ethnic and social minority ‘others.’ In the first





time period, the countries are aligned almost exclusively along ethnic and social divides. The first dimension is ethnic and primordial; the second dimension captures social minorities and is composed of homosexuals, people with AIDS, and drug addicts. Over time, starting in the early 2000s, the ethnic dimension becomes associated with social issues as well. Since the ethnic dimension is usually more salient, the association of ethnic and social suggests that the animosity against minorities is expanding beyond ethnic boundaries.

The second wave of minority rights expansion is more recent, but has a profound impact on radical actor mobilization. The factor analysis of the Slovak case (Table 3.7) shows that the category of 'the other' is jointly composed of ethnic minority groups as well as gays and lesbians, leaving the less salient category to be populated by drug addicts and criminals. The shift can already be observed in ideological appeals of new radical actors emerging in Slovakia. While the Slovak National Party would never openly campaign against homosexuals and reserved its hostility mostly for Hungarians and Roma, a new movement, *Slovenská pospolitost'* (Slovak Togetherness), is merging ethnic, religious, and anti-gay appeals together. It is not uncommon to see graffiti on East European walls calling for gassing Roma, gays, and sometimes Jews, in the spirit of the Nazi period. Creative crafting of homophobic and ethnic appeals is the new norm of radical actor politics.

While members of the majority might not initially feel hostility toward 'the other,' feelings of neutrality (or latent animosity) can be transformed over time. Bickering over changes in ethnic last names or debate over which names for children should be added to the approved list for new parents brings minority issues into the spotlight. Increasing demands for tolerance and rights triggers irritation and mobilizes radical actors. The dynamic of demands, actions, and reaction also helps to explain why radical actor mobilization is highly variable. Primordial hostility might be at the core of mobilization, but the dynamics of minority demands are not constant. Paradoxically, success in radical actor demands might demobilize radical right actor elements, as seen in the sudden demise of the Slovak National Party. The objective of the party to push back language rights for Hungarians was achieved and the base for mobilization thus undermined.

The public understanding of 'the other' is undergoing a transformation. The ethnic other in a democratic setting is becoming associated with policies, such as expanded language rights. The understanding of 'the other' is also expanding and incorporating divergent forms of social life, which were largely suppressed under communism. While the initial hostility toward non-titular minorities that did not constitute federative republics can probably be best explained by primordial grievances, the expansion of minority rights significantly improved the base for radical actor mobilization after 1989. The expansion of minority rights stretched

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1 the boundaries of animosity beyond primordial resentment toward policy
2 hostility. The animosity of radical right actors responded to the democrat-
3 ization of ethnic identity boundaries and lifestyles.

4 Radical right movements adapt to their socio-political environments.
5 Geert Wilders in the Netherlands combines anti-Islamic appeals with
6 Euroskepticism while maintaining his lip service to gay rights. This ideo-
7 logical mixture appeals well to Dutch voters. Similarly, the National Front
8 in France, under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, is abandoning anti-
9 Semitism and focusing exclusively on anti-Islamic sentiments to capitalize
10 on the most salient grievances. We should expect to observe adaptive
11 learning among radical actors in Eastern Europe as well. If gay and lesbian
12 rights are further expanded or if East European countries become signi-
13 ficant receivers of immigration and these trends create unease in the
14 majority population, radical actors will adapt their appeals accordingly (cf.
15 Minkenberg 2009).

17 Conclusion

18 In his theoretical framework for this book, Michael Minkenberg (Chapter
19 2) suggests that the analysis of the transformation of the radical right must
20 identify at least two actors in order to explain contentious politics. Radical
21 right actor mobilization is the price to be paid for democratization, which
22 has fundamentally transformed minority rights in Eastern Europe and has
23 opened doors to group animosity. The transformation of the ways in which
24 group animosity can be mobilized has its roots in three sources: (1) the
25 weakening of the state's coercive power and the politicization of the police
26 force; (2) domestic pressures from below to acknowledge and expand the
27 rights of minorities; and (3) external pressures from abroad, especially
28 from the European Union and the Council of Europe, to enforce minority
29 rights.

30 While the effects of the abrupt transitions to market economy and the
31 determinants of successful democratization have been widely studied, the
32 impact of the rapid expansion of minority rights is still poorly understood.
33 East Europeans have undergone a cultural transformation that redefines
34 identity boundaries. Post-communist societies rapidly transformed rights,
35 but the 'adjustment' in public opinion has been more gradual. Radical
36 right actors exploit this gap for political gains to mobilize group animosity.
37 While radical right actors are pushing back against the transformation, it
38 also presents them with opportunities to capitalize on group animosities
39 and hostilities toward minority demands. Since the transformation is an
40 adaptive process, the future of the illiberal society will depend on the
41 outcome of ongoing negotiations between the majority and 'the trans-
42 forming other.'





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