Introduction

Populism is an anti-establishment, anti-elite ideology and political strategy. Populism as an ideology adopts a discursive approach and focuses on the tensions between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” The “people” can be subsumed into three discursive frames: the nation, the (economic) underdog, and the ordinary people (Canovan 1981, cited under Theoretical Approaches). The narrative of the people as a “nation” is hostile to migrants and ethnic minorities. The populist rhetoric of the “underdog” expresses anxieties related to economic differences. Finally, the language of the “ordinary people” resonates with visions of a simple, everyday life. Populism viewed as a political strategy focuses on its agency, or the ability of populist movements to instrumentally appeal to followers, to maintain a direct relationship between the leader and the followers, and to exploit existing institutional weaknesses. Populists target the establishment and the elites selectively. Populists can become the elite. Yet populist politicians (re)elected to office continue to use anti-elite appeals to delegitimize opponents, even after they have come to represent the very establishment they had attacked in the past. Scholarship on populism has grown exponentially in recent years. In Europe, it is rooted in the study of the radical right, which emphasizes exclusionary identity-driven politics. The rise of populism is often viewed as a consequence of an economic crisis or socioeconomic changes in general. Populist critique also targets the institutional underpinnings of liberal democracy. Populists seek to strengthen majoritarian elements of democracy and undermine minority protections. Populist leaders seek power, and the presence of populist parties in the electoral arena, parliament, government, or presidency reshapes political agendas. Media is a crucial tool of communication used by populist leaders to gain power and to stay in power. Social media, in particular, allows populists to establish and maintain a direct communication channel to their supporters, and populists accuse traditional media of being “corrupt.” Populists are omnipresent. In the West, populism is mostly exclusionary. In the Global South, and especially in Latin America, it is often inclusionary, as it broadens the scope of the people to the previously politically excluded poor and indigenous communities (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, cited under General Overviews). Regionally, this bibliography focuses on populism in Europe and Latin America, but it also includes the United States and other countries (Stockemer 2019, under General Overviews).

General Overviews

Rovira Kaltwasser, et al. 2017 reviews theoretical approaches toward populism, topical issues, and country-level studies. Another comprehensive review is Rydgren 2018, an all-encompassing study at the intersection of populism and radical-right mobilization. Urbinati 2019, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018 are analytical review articles that summarize the literature. Urbinati 2019 and Taggart 2000 discuss the relationship between populism and democracy. Stockemer 2019 offers a comparative view. Team Populism at Brigham Young University assembles an array of scholars and resources on populism.


Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser compare contemporary populisms in Europe and Latin America. They identify two regional subtypes: exclusionary populism in Europe, and inclusionary populism in Latin America.

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser discuss advantages of the so-called ideational approach to the comparative study of populism, and outline four avenues of future research.


The handbook provides state of the art of the scholarship on populism. It lays out the cumulated knowledge on populism, but also the ongoing discussions and research gaps on this topic. It is divided into four sections, covering conceptual approaches, populist forces, interaction between populism and various issues, and normative debates on populism.


The handbook focuses on how the radical right manifests itself as movements rather than parties, and includes a number of case studies both in Europe and beyond. The chapters cover concepts and definitions; ideologies and discourses; and a range of contemporary issues, including religion, globalization, gender, activism, and case studies.


The edited book provides a global overview of populist actors and strategies around the globe from a comparative perspective. It shows how parties from both the radical left and right use a populist discourse.


Taggart focuses on the problems of populism and how it relates to democracy, particularly to representative politics.

Team Populism.

Team Populism brings together renowned scholars from Europe and the Americas to study the causes and consequences of populism.


Urbinati illustrates the context-based character of populism and how its cyclical appearances reflect the forms of representative government. It reviews contemporary interpretations of populism and sketches the main characteristics of populism in power. It also explains how populism transforms the fundamentals of democracy.

**Theoretical Approaches**

The book views populism as a redemptive ideology and not as a pathology of democracy. It offers a typology of populism: agrarian populism and political populism.

The book focuses on political movements and argues for a radical democracy where antagonisms could be expressed. First published in 1977.

The volume underlines that populism is an ambiguous but constitutive component of democratic systems, torn between their ideology and their actual functioning.

The book views populism as part of democratic politics. It brings to the fore the paradoxical nature of modern liberal democracy in which the category of the “adversary” plays a central role.

The book is a pan-European study of populist radical-right parties in Europe. It offers insights into three major aspects of European populist radical-right parties: concepts and classifications, themes and issues, and explanations for electoral failures and successes.

The book argues that a rejection of pluralism is at populism’s core. It shows that populists can govern on the basis of their claim to offer an exclusive moral representation of the people.

The book analyzes the mechanisms used to register a citizen’s expression of confidence or distrust, and then focuses on the role that distrust plays in democracy from both a historical and a theoretical perspective.

Urbinati diagnoses the ills that beset the body politic in an age of hyper-partisanship and media monopolies, and offers a spirited defense of the messy compromises and contentious outcomes that define democracy.

The book identifies populist parties in 21st-century Europe and explains their electoral performance. It argues that populist parties are not dangerous pariahs but reflect the crisis of representative democracy.
The book traces the trajectories of populist right-wing parties from the margins of the political landscape to its center, to understand and explain how they are transforming from fringe voices to persuasive political actors who set the agenda and frame media debates.

**Populism and Identity**

Due to its ideological thinness, populism can co-exist with thicker ideologies, such as nationalism and social conservatism. The most common markers of populism in Europe and the United States are nationalism, nativism, xenophobia, and racism. The ideology of populism is also compatible with religious conservatism, machismo, and anti-intellectualism. Class and gender are important markers of populism as well. Populists also mobilize resentments of working-class males toward economic inequalities, women, and minorities, as well as toward a system that facilitates the advancement of minority groups.

**Populism and Identity: General**

Ionescu and Gellner 1969 reintroduced populism to the social sciences. Ignazi 1992 argues that the extreme right emerged as a backlash to cultural changes. Norris and Inglehart 2019 applies Ignazi’s argument to the current wave of socially conservative populism. Betz 1994 highlights economic conditions behind the surge of the extreme right. Arzheimer 2009 points to the complexity of economic and cultural factors, such as immigration, when explaining support for the extreme right. Ivansflaten 2008 derives extreme-right mobilization from immigration. Kitschelt and McGann 1997 argues that the extreme right originates both in economic shifts as well as in the convergence of mainstream parties toward the median position. Meguid 2008 brings attention to the behavior of nonproximal parties in explaining the electoral fortunes of “niche” parties. Meguid also unveils the consequences of electoral competition between the mainstream parties and insurgent extreme-right wing parties. Bustikova 2014 argues that extreme-right parties mobilize against ascendant minorities. Art 2011 zooms in on party organization structures to show that competent party cadres are needed for extreme parties to succeed.

The book explains the variation in the radical right’s electoral success over the last several decades. It analyzes the dynamics of party building and explores the attitudes, skills and experiences of radical-right activists in eleven different countries. The book links the quality of radical-right activists to broader patterns of success and failure.

Arzheimer explores the sources of unstable electoral support for extremist parties. While immigration and unemployment rates are important, their interaction with other political factors is much more complex than suggested by previous research.

Betz studies the new Western European parties of the radical populist right. The book argues that, in distancing themselves from the reactionary politics of the traditional extremist right, these parties have become a significant challenge to the established structure and politics of Western European democracies.

Bustikova presents a theory of the radical right that emphasizes its reactive nature and views it as a backlash against the political successes of minorities and concessions extracted on their behalf. It focuses on Eastern Europe.

Ignazi defines the "extreme Right" political family and explains their rise. He argues that new extreme right-wing parties emerged due to the changes in the cultural domain and in mass beliefs that have favored radicalization and system polarization, and also due to the emergence of attitudes and demands not treated by the established conservative parties.


Ionescu and Gellner provide a comprehensive collection of works on populism. The book highlights the importance of the phenomenon both as a doctrine and a movement.


Ivarsflaten discusses three grievance mobilization models arising from economic changes, political elitism, and corruption. The study finds that no populist right-wing party performed well in elections around 2002 without mobilizing grievances over immigration.


The book explains the emergence of radical right-wing parties. It focuses on the competitive struggles among parties, their internal organizational patterns, and their long-term ideological traditions. Radical-right authoritarian parties tend to emerge when moderate parties converge toward the median voter. But the success of these parties depends on the strategy employed by right-wing political actors.


Meguid examines variations in the electoral trajectories of the new set of single-issue (niche) parties: green, radical-right, and ethno-territorial parties. The book advances a theory of party competition in which mainstream parties facing unequal competitors have access to a wider and more effective set of strategies than posited by standard spatial models.


The book advances a general theory explaining why the silent revolution in values triggered a backlash fueling support for authoritarian-populist parties and leaders in the United States and Europe. The conclusion highlights the dangers of this development and what could be done to mitigate the risks to liberal democracy.

**Populism and Identity: Race and Immigration**


Abrajano and Hajnal show how immigration reshapes core political identities in the United States. Fears about immigration cause defections of whites from the Democratic to the Republican Party.


Akkerman investigates the direct influence of radical-right parties on immigration and integration policies by comparing the output of twenty-seven cabinets in nine countries in the period between 1996 and 2010.


Hogan and Haltinner examine anti-immigration narratives of the British National Party (UK), the One Nation Party (Australia), the Tea Party Patriots (USA), and the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (USA). Significant similarities in narratives suggest the emergence of a transnational exchange and a populist “playbook.”


Kaufmann explores the decline of white majorities in Western Europe and North America, and shows how these demographic changes led to a populist disruption.


Rydgren identifies meso-level reasons for the increase of popular xenophobia and racism. The presence of a xenophobic radical-right populist party may cause increases in racism and xenophobia.


Using data from six Western European countries, Rydgren provides key distinctions between immigration skepticism and xenophobic attitudes. The analysis indicates limited support for ethnic competition theory and shows that frames linking immigration to criminality and social unrest are particularly effective for mobilizing voter support for the radical right.


Sniderman and Hagendoorn study the deep conflicts of values in the Netherlands between Muslims immigrants and Western Europeans.


The paper examines the bases of opposition to immigrant minorities in Western Europe, focusing on the Netherlands. Considerations of national identity dominate those of economic advantage in evoking exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities.

Soule tests general claims of how political and economic competition affected county-level variation of black lynching rates in Georgia in the 1890s. It shows that rates of racial violence rose when interracial competition increased.


Vieten and Poynting focus on the role of ideology in the rise of far-right populism in Europe. They show that the "othering" and blaming of out-groups is an ideological maneuver that can be traced to fascist tropes of the 1920s and 1930s.

**Populism and Identity: Gender**


The article compares gender ideologies and concrete policy proposals of national and neoliberal populist parties in the Netherlands and Flanders from the 1980s to 2010s. Some parties adhere to a modern or modern-traditional view, while others espouse neo-traditional views.


The article shows that the support base of the British National Party is middle-aged working-class white men who are anxious about immigration and feel threatened by local Muslim communities.


Givens examines a gender gap in the vote for the radical right. Attitudes toward immigration have a disproportionate impact on the probability of voting for radical-right candidates, but not on the gender gap specifically.


The essays analyze the role of masculinity and femininity in the political careers of figures ranging from Evita Perón to Hugo Chávez, and discuss a relationship between populism and authoritarianism in Latin America.


The article compares populist gender ideologies in northern Europe and South America. North American populism defends the status quo, while the left-wing populism in South America is relatively progressive.
Populism and Identity: Class

McCall 2013, Gest 2016, and Lamont 2000 investigate the political consequences of perceived wealth and status inequalities among the working class. Changes in societal structure due to globalization have led to a significant reduction of opportunities for large segments of the traditional working class and radicalized workers. Oxhorn 1998 links class heterogeneity to populist mobilization. In a non-Western context, Jaffrelot 2013 explores the high-tech populism of the middle classes in India.


The book shows that tension between the vestiges of white working-class power and its perceived loss have produced the unique phenomenon of white working-class radicalization.


Jaffrelot scrutinizes the mainstays of Narendra Modi’s election campaign, with special references to high-tech populism.


Lamont analyzes the ways in which black and white working-class men construct their identity and self-worth. Rigid class and race boundaries play an important role in the construction of dignity, with each group constructing a different moral structure.


This book resolves the paradox of how Americans can express little enthusiasm for welfare state policies and still yearn for a more equitable society. It puts forward a new model of preferences about income inequality rooted in labor market opportunities.


Oxhorn argues that the heterogeneous class structure characterizing the popular sectors in Latin America creates collective-action problems that historically have resulted in popular sector mobilization by populist elites.

Populism and Economic Crisis

Populism can emerge as a response to economic crisis or bad governance. When voters suffer economic losses, they lose trust in political elites and political institutions. A significant portion of the literature focuses on the rise of populism as a reaction to major economic breakdowns. Kriesi and Pappas 2015 is an edited volume, which argues that the Great Recession facilitated populism. Edwards 2010 demonstrates that globalization has contributed to the rise of populism in Latin America. Dornbusch and Edwards 2007 ties macroeconomic cyclicity to the politics of discontent in Latin America. Roberts 1995 links social dislocation to the rise of populism in Peru, and Hawkins 2010 views populism as a reaction to corruption and economic crisis in Venezuela. Pirro and Taggart 2018 explores the effect of crisis on Euroskepticism. Ramiro and Gomez 2017 links globalization losers to populism in Spain. Vasilopoulou, et al. 2014 argues that economic crisis led to populist mobilization in Greece. Moffitt 2015 shows that populists can also trigger crisis to benefit from it. Stavrakakis, et al. 2017 is a study of populist discourse affected by a crisis.

The book offers a distinctive macroeconomic perspective on the dynamics of populism in Latin America. It argues that populist governments attempt to revive the economy through massive spending and mostly fail.


Edwards explains why the nations of Latin America have failed to share in the fruits of globalization, and highlights the dangers of the recent turn to economic populism in the region.


The book is a study of the movement of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. It argues that populist movements can be understood as responses to widespread corruption and economic crisis.


The book is a comparative study of the impact of the Great Recession on populism. It focuses on the interplay between economic and political crises and how it facilitates the rise of populism.


This article argues that not only does crisis trigger populism, but also that populism can act as a trigger for crisis. Drawing on empirical examples from Europe, Latin America, North America, and the Asia-Pacific region, Moffitt shows how performance of crisis enables populists to demand strong leadership.


This article offers comparative findings about the nature of populist Euroskepticism in political parties in contemporary Europe in the face of the Great Recession, migrant crisis, and Brexit.


This article analyzes factors behind the support for the new radical-left populist party Podemos in Spain. The party’s supporters are the losers of globalization as well as the economic crisis.


The study of Alberto Fujimori in Peru suggests that a new variant of populism thrives in a context where economic crisis and social dislocation undermine traditional representative institutions.

The article explores how crisis shapes the articulation of populist discourse and the antagonistic narratives developed around populist representations.


This article studies the effect of the Greek crisis on populism. It builds on the theory of democratic populism, providing a distinction between mainstream and fringe populism.

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**Populism and Democracy**

Democracy and populism can be in tension. Populists often espouse a majoritarian view of democracy that is in tension with the pluralism of the proponents of liberal democracies, who argue that minority protection is a fundamental cornerstone of democracy. However, populists also bring neglected topics into mainstream political discourse. A crisis of democracy and its institutions can be studied both as a cause and as a consequence of populism.

**Populism and Democracy: General**


The article provides a comparative conceptual analysis of the logic of populism and the logic of constitutional democracy.


The article measures populist attitudes and investigates whether these attitudes can be linked to specific party preferences.


The book links right-wing populism to cultural and economic Europeanization. It argues that the emergence of the movement in the 1990s was a historical surprise.


The article disentangles the democratizing promises that left-wing populists make while seeking office from their autocratic practices once in power.


The article explains the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes and links it to populism. The argument is demonstrated through a comparative analysis of all fourteen elected presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010.


The article explores populism in Britain. It untangles left- and right-wing populism, the notion of a populist zeitgeist, and the distinct characteristics of populism.


The book offers a cross-regional perspective on populism and its impact on democracy—both as a threat and as a potential corrective.


The article explores factors that enable or hinder populist presidents in Latin America to pursue a radical strategy of institutional change and to erode horizontal checks and balances.

**Populism and Democracy: Quality of Democracy**

Huber and Schimpf 2017 and Huber and Ruth 2017 explore how populist parties relate to the key features of democracy: representation and participation. Guasti and Rezende 2019 explores the extent to which populists delineate contemporary policies, politics, and policy as misrepresentation of “the people.” Enyedi 2016 and Hanley and Vachudova 2018 discuss the quality of democracy and the rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe.


The paper explores the ideologies of two Hungarian parties typically considered as populist: Fidesz and Jobbik.


This article explores populist claims of misrepresentation, used to appeal to an enemy/antagonist (strategy); identify causes of misrepresentation related to policies, politics, and polity (persuasion); and claim to create a new linkage to “the people” (reframing).


The article explores democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe and the rise of the new Czech populist movement ANO.


The article assesses the influence of populist parties on two central aspects of democracy, participation and representation, using data from thirty-one European countries from 1990 until 2014.


The study examines the differences and commonalities in how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy.

Populism and Democracy: Electoral Mobilization


The book examines the grassroots transformation of the bourgeois politics in Weimar Germany before the Nazi breakthrough in 1930. Fritzsche shows how the traditional bourgeois parties were eclipsed by a new breed of populist politicians who not only resisted the left but also embraced public activism and attacked big business, German conservatism, and the Weimar state itself.


Jansen proposes a new, practice-based approach to populism. He conceptualizes populism as a mode of a political practice, as a populist mobilization. Its utility is demonstrated through an application to mid-20th-century Latin American politics.


The book focuses on the particular vulnerability of patronage-based party systems to populism. It shows that populists win elections when the institutionalized ties between nonpopulist parties and voters decay.


Knight critically assesses the literature on Latin American populism to delineate the key features of the populist political style, Manichean worldview, and the notion of a crisis.


Parker and Barreto link past and present reactionary movements in American politics to explore the motivations of Tea Party supporters. The book shows that while Barack Obama’s election was a trigger, neither ideology or racism alone explain the reemergence of this.
reactionary movement. Tea Party supporters are mobilized by fear and the perception of America being stolen from “real Americans.”


The article explores the electoral rise of unorthodox parties in Eastern European elections. It shows that these electoral dynamics can be explained by focusing on the interaction between protest voting and election sequence.

**Populism and Democracy: Technocracy**

Caramani 2017 and Bickerton and Accetti 2017 theoretically assess how populism and technocracy challenge the principles of representative democracy and interact with each other. Bertsou and Pastorella 2017 analyzes the relationship between attitudes toward technocracy and democracy. Pastorella 2016 examines the extent to which technocratic governments weaken party democracy. Bustikova and Guasti 2019 and Manucci and Amsler 2018 (cited under Populism and Media: General) explore the rise of new populist movements in the Czech Republic and Italy, respectively, and the appeal of technocratic populism. Like Silva 1991, Bustikova and Guasti 2019 links the contemporary technocratic populism to the previous authoritarian regime. Mietzner 2015 and Thompson 2010 focus on electoral competition between various forms of populism in Asia, including technocratic populism.


Bertsou and Pastorella analyze citizens’ attitudes toward technocracy and the idea of governance by unelected experts. They find that individual beliefs about the merits of democracy influence technocratic attitudes, along with trust in current representative political institutions and historical legacies.


The article explores complementarity between populism and technocracy. The complementarity consists in the fact that both populism and technocracy critique “party democracy.”


The article investigates the political logic and ideological appeal of technocratic populism in the Czech Republic. It highlights the adaptive character of technocratic populism across political regimes.


The article analytically compares populism and technocracy as alternative forms of political representation to party government. It argues that populist and technocratic principles of representation challenge fundamental features of party democracy.


Manucci and Amsler analyze the post-ideological approach and strategic adaptability of the Five Star Movement’s online discourse over time. While the importance of direct democracy is constant, different salient topics and policies are raised depending on political and social

The book analyzes the dynamics of the 2014 electoral competition between two populist contenders in Indonesia. In the absence of an acute crisis, radical right exclusive populism (Prabowo) was defeated by inclusive, technocratic populism (Jokowi) promising improvement in public service delivery.


Pastorella analyzes technocratic governments in Europe. The research indicates that technocratic governments increase pressure on domestic political actors, weaken partisan ideology-based politics, and loosen accountability ties between the voters, parties, and cabinets.


Silva highlights how technocratic character of the opposition to the authoritarian rule in Chile fostered the rise of young neoliberal technocrats the so-called ‘Chicago boys’ and contributed to a lasting technocratization of Chilean politics.


Thomson analyzes the competition between populist and reformist narratives in the Philippines. Unlike in Thailand, this competition is less polarizing in the Philippines due to the organizational weakness of the Philippine populism and shared anger among the opponents toward the Arroyo administration and its abuses.

**Populism and Power**

This section discusses the implications of populists obtaining political power. When populists govern, anti-establishment appeals can be delegitimized. Conversely, power enhances populist agendas as populism becomes a (more) mainstream ideology. This section also discusses whether populists govern well and their interactions with coalition partners.

**Populism and Power: General**

Rydgren 2005 explores the emergence of radical-right populist parties in Western Europe. Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016 examines the internal dynamics and organization of radical-right parties in Western Europe. Arzheimer 2015 analyzes the rise of the far-right party Alternative for Germany. Conniff, et al. 2012 examines populism and populist parties in Latin America. Akkerman and de Lange 2012 scrutinizes the electoral effects of government participation of radical-right parties, while Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016 investigates reactions of domestic and international actors to the governing alliance of left-wing and right-wing populist parties. Rooduijn, et al. 2014 shows that the success of populist niche parties does not necessarily lead to mainstream parties becoming more populist. Froio, et al. 2017 investigates the complex processes of party platforms’ adaptation to new issues. Pappas 2019 argues that the goal of contemporary populists is the establishment of an illiberal, but democratic, order.


The article focuses on the electoral effects of government participation of radical-right parties in national governments.

The article analyzes the ascent of the far-right Euroskeptic Alternative for Germany (AfD). It shows that the AfD is currently neither populist nor belongs to the family of radical-right parties.


The article investigates reactions of domestic and international actors to the first-ever governing alliance of left-wing and right-wing populist parties in Europe—the Greek SYRIZA-ANEL government.


The book examines the notion of populism in the political and social culture of Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.


The article investigates how the policy content of the governmental legislative program responds to governing and opposition party platforms, the executive agenda, and issue priorities of the public and mass media in Britain.


The volume explores a range of populist political parties in Western Europe. It examines their internal dynamics and questions whether it is possible to discern or construct a general “populist” party typology of organization and representation.


The article argues that, once in power, modern populists seeks to establish an order that is democratic but not liberal.


The article examines whether populism is contagious and, in particular, programmatic reactions of the mainstream parties to the rise of populist parties. When populists succeed, mainstream parties adapt, but they do not change their programs. Successful populist parties, however, tone down their populism.


The article explains the emergence of extreme right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. Successful radical-right parties combine ethnonationalist xenophobia with anti-political-establishment populism.
Populism and Power: Leadership

Hawkins 2009 explores elite-level populist discourse in more than forty governments around the world. Roberts 2006 shows that patterns of populist mobilization are influenced by underlying structural and institutional conditions. Shogan 2007 explores populist anti-intellectualism as a strategic response to plebiscitary demands. Similarly, Bonikowski and Gidron 2015 shows that populism is primarily a strategic tool of political challengers. Oliver and Rahn 2016 studies populist appeal as a mechanism of political mobilization. Stavrakakis, et al. 2016 analyzes Chavismo as a leadership form and social movement. Meret 2015 analyzes a female populist leadership style, and Phongpaichit and Baker 2008 looks at the evolution of Thaksin populism in Thailand.


The paper examines populist claim-making in U.S. presidential elections between 1952 and 1996. It shows that populism is primarily a strategic tool of political challengers, particularly those who have legitimate claims to an outsider status.


The article explores populism as discourse. It explores elite-level populist discourse in more than forty current and past governments from a variety of countries across the world, with a special focus on Latin America.


The article examines the role of gender in style, rhetoric, and discursive strategies of Pia Kjærsgaard, as well as her gendered portrayal by the Danish mainstream media. It highlights the specifics of a Nordic female leadership framework.


The article studies populist appeals as a mechanism of political mobilization in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. It shows that Trump’s supporters are distinctive as they uniquely combine anti-expertise, anti-elitism, and pronationalist sentiments.


The article analyzes the rise and fall of Thaksin Shinawatra’s populism in Thailand. It shows that it emerged as a response to the demands and insecurities of the large informal mass created by an outward-orientated strategy of development, and in the absence of mass organization.


Roberts examines different patterns of populist mobilization in Latin America. He shows that patterns of populist mobilization are influenced but not directly determined by underlying structural and institutional conditions. Electoral competition alone is not a sufficient condition to produce extensive grassroots organization, especially where mass media appeals have diminished the labor-intensive character of electoral mobilization.

Shogan explores how Republican presidents have adopted anti-intellectualism as a conservative form of populism as a strategic response to the plebiscitary demands of presidential politics.


The article employs ethnographic field research on social movements to analyze Chavismo in Venezuela. The article shows that Chavista “caesaro-plebeian” populism is construed as a site of tension and contention, which entails both promises and dangers for democracy.

**Populism and Power: Radicalization of the Mainstream**


Focusing on the rising support for the populist right in Eastern Europe, Bustikova examines how anger and resentment toward minorities is being utilized in politics. It argues that radical right parties mobilize against politically ascendant ethnic minorities, rather than in response to economic crises or widespread xenophobia.


The article investigates the recent government participation of a number of radical right-wing populist parties in Western European democracies.


The book focuses on the ideology, impact, and electoral performance of the populist radical right in Eastern Europe.


The book is a study of the interaction between discursive influence, party competition, and the electoral fortunes of radical-right parties in Central and Eastern Europe.

The article analyzes thirty-two parties in five Western European countries between 1989 and 2008 to show that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse.


The article explores mainstream populist discourses and their function: to satisfy rival wings of the respective parties, neoliberals and social conservatives, that do not always share the same policy priorities.


Zulianello analyzes 66 contemporary parties across Europe to provide a comprehensive typology of populist parties.

Populism and Power: Niche Parties in Office


The article highlights the balancing act of regionalist populists between being a party of government and a movement of opposition. This “one foot in and one foot out” of government approach transformed the Lega Nord into an “institutionalized” populist movement.


The article underlines the importance of conducting a thorough negotiation of policy goals and the timing of their implementation before joining the government.


The article assesses the performance of radical-left parties participating in coalition governments. The experience of coalition government for radical-left parties presents many pitfalls.


The article draws a conceptual distinction between traditional right-wing extremist and right-wing populist parties, and examines the performance of the latter in public office.

This article is an in-depth exploration of Syriza’s discourse, covering the period from its emergence as a loose coalition of parties and groups in 2004 up to the campaign that led to its accession to power in 2015.


The article examines the role of the radical right in the political process and the porosity of borders between the radical and the mainstream right in the European context.


The article compares the parliamentary voting behavior of the left-wing and right-wing populist parties. Shared populism is manifested in opposition to supranational institutions, but on all other issues, the left/right position is more important for voting behavior.


The article explains fringe party failure by electoral “squeeze” by mainstream parties, and the high propensity of the fringe party electorate for volatility in electoral mobilization.

**Populism and Media**

Access to new media greatly enhances the ability of populist leaders to directly communicate their message. This section explores the relationship between revolutionary changes in mass communication and populism.

**Populism and Media: General**


The article investigates the effects of inclusion and exclusion on the policy agendas of radical-right parties. It shows that non-ostracized radical-right parties have become just as radical as their ostracized cousins, and that *cordons sanitaires* do not have a freezing effect.


The article analyzes the rise of an “accelerated pluralism” in which the Internet contributes to the ongoing fragmentation of the present system of interest-based group politics and a shift toward a more fluid, issue-based group politics with less institutional coherence.

The article investigates the presence and forms of populist frames in the discourse of the extreme right by looking at different types of extreme-right organizations in Italy and Germany.


The article explores an ethno-nationalist nostalgic rhetoric promoted by radical right-wing parties in Europe, and shows how parties use perceived threats against national identity for political purposes.


The book presents an original interpretation of identity politics and media behavior in Austria, Germany, Greece, and France since the 1980s.


The article analyzes the online political discourse of the Five Star Movement (5SM) in Italy and its strategic adaptability. It shows that 5SM’s post-ideological, flexible, and adaptable approach, and its emphasis on direct-democratic tools, constitutes a successful electoral appeal.


Moffitt contends that populism is not one entity, but rather a political style that is performed, embodied, and enacted across different political and cultural contexts.


The article introduces the concept of “political style” as a new way of thinking about populism. It argues that populism as a political style enables deeper understanding of how populism appears across the political spectrum.


The article analyzes populism in public debates in the media. It shows that political debates have become more populist over the years, and that the degree of populism is strongly related to the success of populist parties. It highlights the role of tabloid media in the spread of populism.

Populism and Media: Conspiracy Theories

Barkun 2013 and Moore 2018 show how conspiracy theories move from societal margins to the mainstream contemporary politics, and analyze how this affects partisanship and populism. Castanho Silva, et al. 2017 and Oliver and Wood 2014 explore a relationship between...
Conspirational beliefs and populist attitudes.


The book explores a transformation of a subculture of conspiracy into a mainstream cultural phenomenon in America.


The article explores the relationship between populist attitudes and conspiratorial beliefs at the individual level. It shows that belief in conspiracies among greedy, but not necessarily purely evil, elites are associated with populism.


The article provides a review of three books on conspiracy theories. It places the problem of conspiracy theories firmly in the context of democratic politics, opening important empirical and conceptual questions about partisanship, populism, publicity, and secrecy.


The article examines the nature of support for conspiracy theories among the public. The support for conspiracy theories is strongly predicted by a willingness to believe in other unseen, intentional forces and an attraction to Manichean narratives.